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Marc Stier ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE vii A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY xxxvii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xli PART ONE CHALLENGES FOR LIBERAL CHAPTER ONE THE TROUBLE WITH LIBERALISM 2 §1. Philosophies and Principles 3 §2. The Challenge of Liberty 9 §3. The Challenge of Democracy and Equality 14 §4. The Challenge of the Politics of the Good 16 a. Environmentalism 17 §5. Liberalism and the Politics of the Good 28 CHAPTER TWO NATURALIST LIBERALISM 30 §6. Naturalist Metaphysics and Epistemology 32 a. Epistemological Naturalism 32 §7. Subjectivist Philosophical Psychology 36 §8. Naturalism and Liberalism 38 §9. The Denial of Substantive Rationality 41 §10. The Primacy of Instrumental Reason 42 §11. Two Versions of Naturalist Liberalism 43 §13. The Flight from Politics 47 a. The Instrumental Conception of Politics 48 §14. The Failure of Naturalist Liberalism: Rights 54 §15. The Failure of Naturalist Liberalism: The Good 59 CHAPTER THREE HISTORICIST LIBERALISM 62 §16. The Failure of Naturalism and the Turn to Philosophical Historicism 62 §17. Interpretavist Philosophical Psychology 66 §18. Historicist Liberalism 70 §19. The Limits of Historicist Liberalism: Rights 72 §20. The Limits of Historicist Liberalism: The Good 78 CHAPTER FOUR PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM 85 §21. Varieties of Perfectionism 86 a. Anti-Perfectionism and the Liberalism of Fear 87 §22. Justifying a Conception of the Good 92 §23. The Limits of Perfectionism: Liberty 94 §24. The Limits of Perfectionism: Distributive Justice 97 §25. The Limits of Perfectionism: Perfectionism and the Common Good 100 CHAPTER FIVE POLITICAL LIBERALISM 102 §26. The Aims of Political Liberalism 104 §27. Ground Floor or Second Story Political Liberalism? 108 a. Problems on the Second Story 110 §28. Inclusive or Exclusive Political Liberalism? 119 §29. Political Liberalism and the Possibility of Moral Discovery 124 PART TWO REASON AND THE HUMAN GOOD` 128 CHAPTER SIX DILEMMAS OF CONTEMOPRARY PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY §30. Problems for Subjectivism and Interpretavism I: §31. Problems for Subjectivism and
Interpretavism II: CHAPTER SEVEN WANTS AND DESIRES 148 §32. Wants and Desires: The Basic Distinction 149 §33. Desires, Wants and Emotions 154 §34. Reflection and The Articulation of Wants 159 §35. Emotions and Human Fulfillment: A First Look 171 §36. Phenomena of Individual and Political and Social Life Revisited 175 a. Uncertainty and Mistakes About Our Ends 176 §37. Human Nature and Explanation and CHAPTER EIGHT HUMAN WANTS AND §38. Reflection and Substantive Rationality 189 §39. The Role of a Conception of Human Nature 192 §40. The Relative Importance of Our Desires and Wants 196 §41. The Satisfaction of Human Wants: Pessimistic Perspectives 199 §42. The Satisfaction of Human Wants: Optimistic Perspectives 200 §43. Critical Interpretavism and Plato's Republic 205 CHAPTER NINE INDIVIDUAL AND COMMON GOOD 212 §44. The Good Polity and Society and Distributive Justice 212 §45. The Importance of Political and Social Theory 215 §46. Political Theory and the Human Good: §47. The Human Good and Our Good 224 §48. The Virtues 228 CHAPTER TEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 231 §49. The Independence of Practice 231 §50. Technical, Interpretative, and Educative Uses of Political and Social Theory 234 §51. The Preconditions of Educative Transformation 240 §52. Technical Uses of Theory in the Service of Educative Political and Social Transformation 245 §53. Political Theory and Tyranny 248 PART THREE PRAGMATIC RATIONALISM AND POLITICS 251 CHAPTER ELEVEN RATIONALITY 252 §54. A Pragmatic View of Rationality 252 §55. The Aims of Rational Inquiry 257 §56. Ideal Rationality 264 §57. The Formal Aspect of Ideal Rationality 279 §58. Truth 284 CHAPTER TWELVE RATIONALITY AND RIGHTS 296 §59. Do We Need an Independent Defense of Rights? 296 §60. The Presupposition of Rationality in Politics 299 §61. The Limits of Rationality in Politics 302 §62. Formal Rationality and Political Philosophy 308 a. Universalization 309 §63. An Outline of the Principles of Political Right 330 CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE CHOICE OF §64. Consent 336 §65. Critical Interpretavism and the Theory of Political Right. 346 §66. Republican Government 349 §67. Dimensions of Political Inequality 354 a. Majoritarianism and Pluralism 355 §68. Rationality—Formal and Substantive—and Political Inequality 388 a. Substantive Rationality and the Choice of a Form of Government 390 §69. Consent and Corporations 404 §70. Neutrality, Compromise and Subsidiarity 407 CHAPTER FOURTEEN CIVIL LIBERTY 417 §71. Why Civil Liberty I?: Rational Argument and the Good 417 §72. Why Civil Liberty II?: Impartiality and the Reconstructed Original Position 422 §73. The Limits of Civil Liberty 432 §74. What Civil Liberty Does and Does Not Require 443 §75. The Claims of Religion 447 CHAPTER FIFTEEN JUSTICE 452 §76. Equality of Opportunity 452 §77. Justice and the Good 464 §78. Desert 471 §79. The Difference Principle 475 a. From the Good to the Difference Principle 475 §80. Justice, Equity and Care 499 CHAPTER SIXTEEN RATIONALITY AND MORALITY 517 §81. Why Do the Right Thing? 517 CONCLUSION THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 529 §82. Aspirations to the Right and the Good 529 §83. Are The Right and the Good Compatible? 537 ENDNOTES 553 BIBLIOGRAPHY 655 |