book I and the beginning of book II: introduction The initial scene. Socrates is attending a religious festival at the Piraeus, the port of Athens with Glaucon, Plato’s brother. He is there to pray to the goddess And to see the festival, at which Bendis, a Thracian goddess, will be introduced in the Piraeus Socrates is motivated to go, in part by piety (of a kind which we will examine later) and in part, by curiosity Curiosity is central to the desire of philosophers He likes the Thracian procession as much as the Athenian one As we learn later, philosophers are capable of transcending the beliefs of any polis. Socrates is playfully accosted by a slave of Polemarchus who is with group of friends. The slave tells Socrates that Polemarchus "orders" him to wait Socrates would prefer to go on But Polemarchus says that his group outnumbers Socrates and Glaucon there are fewer of Socrates suggests that he might persuade Polemarchus to let him go But Polemarchus says that they won’t listen to him Adeimantus persuades Socrates to stay to see a torch race on horseback. Socrates is enticed, that is, because of his curiosity But they never get to the torch race, instead they; instead they talk all through the night This shows that relative importance to Socrates and philosophers of knowledge of the forms as opposed to sights and sounds. Socrates goes with Polemarchus to his house, where he again meets Polemarchus’s father, Cephalus Cephalus, is an old, rich trader who is a metic (resident foreigner) Socrates asks about what it is like to be old. Cephalus talks about how, now that he is old, and no longer dominated by the desires of his youth for sex, food, drink and other such things, he is more interested in talk. While he says he is glad to be rid of these desires for they are "mad masters," he says that old age is only "moderately burdensome." Part of the problem with old age seems to be the fear of death, and punishment for one’s sins. Another part of the problem seems to be that, for Cephalus, human beings are in one of two situations: When young, we suffer from the desires whose satisfaction is the only source of pleasure. We suffer because Our desires are sometimes or often unsatisfied. Our desires lead us to do things that we later regret doing. We might hurt ourselves hurt others displease the gods, who might punish us as a result. We find it distasteful to be driven by our desires, to feel like we lack control over ourselves. Or when old, we lack these desires, are more or less content, but live without pleasure. Cephalus does not say life when old is good, only that it is "moderately burdensome." Socrates argues in book IX that these are not the only alternatives, for there are pure pleasures that are not preceded by the pain of unsatisfied drives. Socrates asks whether Cephalus's wealth makes old age easier. Cephalus says that it has enabled him to avoid injustice and thus to feel confident that he will not be punished after death. That is, justice is good for its consequences or is extrinsically good. Socrates takes Cephalus’s response as giving an answer to the question of "what is justice?" Cephalus says that it is paying debts to the gods and man. For him, we should be just to avoid punishment. In restating Cephalus’s answer, Socrates drops the notion of paying debts to the gods. Socrates never takes up this question again, perhaps giving an indication of his view of the importance of the gods. Socrates finds difficulties with this rule of justice by testing the rule against what we believe about particular case. Sometimes it seems that we shouldn't pay one's debts as when a madman asks us to return a knife we have borrowed. This way of testing any account of justice is implicit in the rest of the book. Socrates suggests that we do have some reasonable beliefs about what is just in particular cases, This is likely to be particularly true in extreme cases, such as the one he discusses with Cephalus But we do not have general knowledge of what justice is. Such knowledge might be especially useful in those cases in which we are unsure about what justice requires. Socrates’s critique of Cephalus’s view of justice suggests more than that this particular definition of justice is mistaken. For it suggests that justice cannot be defined in terms of rules. Socrates will provide an alternative view of justice later in The Republic. Cephalus leaves to return to the sacrifices, which indicates that He is more worried than he admits about having offended the gods, perhaps because of the indiscretions of his youth. He is uncomfortable with a discussion that challenges his idea of justice, again, perhaps because to question his notion of justice raises doubts about whether the Gods will be satisfied with his actions. Cephalus, because of his age, symbolizes the traditional, conventional views of justice of the polis. To adequately examine justice requires us to put aside or call into question these conventional ideas. For more on this theme, see below on the cave. Polemarchus After Socrates rejects Polemarchus’s defense of Cephalus’s view of justice, Polemarchus puts forward a new view: justice is helping friends and harming enemies. We may call Polemarchus’s conception of justice a parochial view. Justice, for Polemarchus, is taking care of one’s own, those who we help us, or for whom we are responsible. It is the view of typically found: in members of a family, who look out for each other in preference to members of other families; among friends, who look out for each other in preference to other people; and among members of a polis or political community, who look out for each other in preference to other political communities. The parochial view raises the question of who is one’s own: whose concerns do we give preference to when our family comes into conflict with our friends or with the political community to which we belong? The parochial view presupposes that conflict between human beings is endemic and ineradicable. Conflict arises because there are not enough goods to satisfy the desires of everyone. So some people will have less than they desire. The parochial view tells us that, in those circumstances, we should give preference to our own. Many questions can be raised about the parochial view of justice. The fundamental one is to wonder whether it is even a view of justice. Implicit in this question is an alternative view, which I will call the cosmopolitan view. Socrates challenges Polemarchus’s conception of justice by implicitly comparing it to another, cosmopolitan conception. A cosmopolitan view of justice holds that justice requires us to treat everyone by the same standard. It does not distinguish between friends and enemies but between those who live up to this standard and those who do not. On a cosmopolitan view, we should give any preference to our own, to our family, friends or political community just because they are our own. We should treat them in accordance with the same standards that we treat everyone else. To accept the cosmopolitan view of justice, one must make one or both of the following assumptions. We must assume that cosmopolitan justice is affordable. We must suppose that that treating others justly in this sense does not so diminish our supply of goods as to make us vulnerable to severe impoverishment or conquest. Or we must assume that being just, in the cosmopolitan sense, will be rewarded by God in another life. Socrates implicitly raises this cosmopolitan view by making a number of criticisms of Polemarchus. Who are our friends? Socrates asks whether our friends are those who we believe are good and useful to us or those we believe are good and useful Polemarchus responds that people help those who they believe are good and useful But, Polemarchus admits that people can make mistakes about this In which case, Socrates says, they will help bad people and hurt good people. Good people will then be their enemies and bad ones their friends.. But good people are just and can do no harm So by Polemarchus’s definition, it is just to harm a person who does not do wrong. Polemarchus resolves this problem by revising his definition: he holds that our friends are those who is both useful and believed to be useful. Socrates’s questions points out two problems in Polemarchus’s view First, Socrates implicitly raises the cosmopolitan view when, instead of talking about those who help us and those who harm us, he talks about those who are good and those who are bad For those who help us and, from the parochial view are just and good, might be, from the cosmopolitan view, unjust and bad. A gang of thieves help each other. So they are just from the standpoint of the parochial view. But, from a cosmopolitan view, they are unjust. Polemarchus, as politician Second, Socrates raises the question of whether we know our own interest. Polemarchus assumes that the question here is, do we know who will help us attain the satisfaction of our desires? But Socrates may be suggesting a deeper question, do we know what desires we should have, that is, what ends or goals would enable us to live a fulfilled life? This question raises the possibility of our making a deep mistake about what a good or fulfilled life would be. We shall see Socrates defends such a view in The Republic. Should just man harm anyone at all? Socrates points out that doing harm makes things such as animals worse. Then he points out that, by analogy, harming human beings would lead them to deteriorate in virtue. The Greek word which is generally translated as virtue, arete, means human excellence in general. Socrates argues that other crafts, such as music or horsemanship, cannot make people worse. So he supposes that justice would not make people worse, in the sense of less virtuous. If we make someone less virtuous, we would be the worse off. This argument is problematic for a number of reasons. Socrates supposes that justice is a craft or techne. This is the view Socrates takes in other dialogues by Plato, which are thought by many scholars to be earlier than The Republic, and thus possibly more reflective of Socrates’s actual views. But this claim is rejected in The Republic. Instead, justice turns out to be the proper ordering of the various crafts. Socrates’s argument presupposes the cosmopolitan view of justice. He suggests that we benefit when other people are virtuous and just. But this is only true if one assumes a cosmopolitan view of justice. On the parochial view, if one of our enemies might be just (in that he helps his friends and harms his enemies) we will be the worse off. Polemarchus does not quite grasp the nature of Socrates’s criticisms of his argument. In particular, he does not recognize that Socrates’s arguments presupposes the cosmopolitan view of justice. Polemarchus’s views and confusion are very understandable, if we stop to think of his own role in life. Polemarchus is a politician in the Athenian democracy. The parochial view of justice reflects one of the tasks of politicians, which is to form coalitions that are, at least in part, based upon securing goods for the members of that coalition (helping friends) which often means taking from competing coalitions (hurting enemies.) Another task of a politician is to support the interest of Athens and its allies (helping friends) and undermine the opponents of Athens (hurting enemies). Many politicians in a democracy—as well as many citizens—are, however, reluctant to admit that the view of justice implicit in their politics is the parochial view. Rather, we want to claim that our side—whether it is our family, our friends, out political allies, or political community—is fighting not just for ourselves but for justice in the cosmopolitan sense. That is, we want to see ourselves as doing the right thing. Democratic politicians and citizens do this for, at least, four reasons. We hope to built support for our side by showing that our aims are not self-serving but just, in the cosmopolitan sense. We find the parochial view of justice unattractive and uncomfortable. We would like to believe that life is not all struggle and conflict. Yet, as we saw above, that is implicit in the parochial view. We would like the gain the support of the gods, who are often (though not always) thought to support the cosmopolitan view of justice. If we are just in both sense, then there will be no conflicts between and among our family, our political allies, and the citizens of our polis. But if we can only be just in the parochial sense, then the question is raised, who are our friends? That is, who should we support if there is some conflict between and among our family, our political allies, and the citizens of our polis. So Polemarchus is, in essence, torn between the parochial view of justice he defends, and the cosmopolitan view he finds attractive. He would like to think that there is no difference between them, precisely because he and his family, friends, political allies, and fellow citizens are just in both sense. Thrasymachus Thrasymachus’s views of justice are, at base, the parochial view defended by Polemarchus. The only difference is that Thrasymachus is much more aware of what that view presupposes and what follows from it. He has no illusions about combining the parochial and cosmopolitan views. Thrasymachus’s initial conception of justice is that it is the advantage of the stronger. He accepts, but points out the tension in the parochial view. Thrasymachus shows us that there is division within any polis between the supporters of democracy (who tend to be the many, poorer people), oligarchy (who tend to be the fewer, richer people) and of a tyrant. When each group attains power in a polis, they make laws that suit themselves and call those laws just. They, in essence, help their friends and hurt their enemies. Polemarchus, who is a supporter of democracy, doesn’t wish to see this conflict. As a supporter of the democracy, he claims that democratic government benefits everyone. assumes justice is concerned with whole city Socrates’s attempts to rebut Thrasymachus’s view by comparing a ruler to other craftsmen Other craftsmen, such as the captain of a ship, a shepherd, or a doctor, use their knowledge and power for the benefit of those they have power over. The captain of a ship rules the ship for the benefit of the sailors. A doctor tells his patient what to do for the benefit of the patient. A shepherd seeks the benefit of his sheep. Thus a political ruler should rule to the benefit of those he rules over, the people. Thrasymachus rejects this claim by pointing out that shepherds benefit their sheep only in the short term. In the long term, they bring the sheep to market to be slaughtered. Thrasymachus’s revised conception of justice: justice is the advantage of the other. To be justice is to serve the interests of other people. Thus it is not in our interest to be just. People who are unjust always get the better off, and get more goods, than those who are just. Although Thrasymachus’s second view of justice is, on the surface, very different from his first view, in one way, it is not really different. In his first view, Thrasymachus takes the standpoint of those who have power in a political community. For them, justice is helping friends and harming enemies. Justice provides mutual benefits to the rulers and their friends. Thus justice is in their interest, at least for a time. In his second view, Thrasymachus takes the standpoint of those without power in the political community. For them, justice is doing what the rulers say. And the rulers require everyone else to benefit them, that is, the rulers. Thus justice is not in their interest. Again, this second conception of justice is another way to look at the parochial view. Polemarchus was, implicitly, looking at justice from the standpoint of people who have some control over their lives. They can choose to come together with other people for their mutual benefit. Thrasymachus has us look at it from the point of those who have little control over their lives, and have to do what the rulers demand. The key point Thrasymachus reveals to us, in this interpretation of his views, is that political communities are deeply divided. Any conception of justice within them will be partisan and one-sided. Thus he utterly rejects, not Polemarchus’s views, but Polemarchus’s tendency to think that the parochial and cosmopolitan views can be brought together. On another level, Thrasymachus’s two views point us to the instability of any grouping of friends and enemies. After defining justice in his second way, Thrasymachus tells us we are better off being unjust. At first look, this does not seem to apply to those who are stronger and rule in a political community. As I indicated above, they seem to have an interest in being just, that is, in helping their friends and harming their enemies. Justice, on this view, is the mutual aid of a group of people, who may be family members, friends, political allies, or the members of a political community. But, any one individual can always decide that his interests would be better served by betraying his friends. He might join another group of people, who are more likely to hold political power. Or, if he is strong and powerful, he might seek to gain sole political power and become a tyrant. Tyranny, as Thrasymachus points out, is the ultimate injustice. Those who committee small crimes are called unjust and, often, punished. But those who commit the greatest crime of seizing power are admired and called just. They are called just precisely because, in gaining power, they make new rules of justice and injustice that benefit themselves. The greatest injustice, then, is to overturn the conception of justice found in a political community On a final level, Thrasymachus’s two views can be seen as a critique of the rationality of the cosmopolitan view of justice. The cosmopolitan view does suggest that justice is helping others. At the very least it is treating others fairly and by the same rules one wants to be treated. Thrasymachus claims, however, that we have not good reason to accept and act on the cosmopolitan conception of justice. For it is not in our interest to do so. In making this claim, he is restating the fundamental claim of the parochial view of justice: there are not enough good things for everyone. Thus if we are to be happy, we must take from other people. Socrates responds to Thrasymachus with a number of arguments that trap and trip him up. By confounding Thrasymachus and shutting him up, Socrates shows that he is a better practitioner of the art of persuasion, or rhetoric, than Thrasymachus. But Socrates’s arguments against Thrasymachus are, in fact, deeply flawed. Perhaps because they are (dimly) aware of these flaws, Glaucon and Adeimantus renew Thrasymachus’s argument in Book II and force Socrates to give a lengthier defense of justice. One argument Socrates makes is very important, however. Thrasymachus had replied to Socrates’s previous argument that that craftsmen, such doctors, shepherds, and ship captains actually do not rule for the benefit of the ruled. This is most plausible in the claim in the case of shepherds, as we saw above. Socrates argues, however, that a doctor who is not most interested in the well being of his patient will not actually be practicing medicine. Thus a ruler who is not concerned with the good of the citizens is not carrying out the task of a ruler. Thrasymachus wonders why anyone would carry out these tasks. Socrates suggests that they do so because they are paid to do so. All craftsmen carry out two crafts, their specialized craft, and the craft of making money or earning a wage. Thus Socrates distinguishes between two kinds of goods involved in the exercise of craft activity. What we might call the internal or intrinsic good of an craft (or an activity) is that which can only be accomplished by taking part in that particular craft. The internal or intrinsic good of practicing medicine is to cure or prevent disease. This is the goal that can only be attained by the practice of medicine. The internal or intrinsic good of the craft might also include the good of performing that craft for the craftsman. If, for example, a craftsmen enjoyed the challenge of carrying out her activity, that would be part of the internal good of the craft. The extrinsic or external good of a craft is a good that can be obtained by many ways, or by the practice of many crafts. Thus doctors receive the external or extrinsic goods of money and recognition. These goods are external or intrinsic because they can be obtained through practicing other crafts. Precisely because craftsmen must, if they are to carry out their craft, be concerned with the internal or intrinsic good of the craft, they must receive some external or extrinsic goods in order to perform that craft. Carrying out a craft properly might cost a craftsmen money and certainly takes time, in which he might be doing some other activity to earn a living. So the craftsmen must be compensated. This distinction is important for a number of reasons. It suggests that there is something beyond craft knowledge that regulates when and where certain crafts are used. Payment in money or recognition motivates people to carry out their crafts. Thus the distribution of money and the exchange of money for services determines who, when, where, and for what purpose certain crafts are exercised There might, however, be other ways in which this can be determined. And, as we see, the central concern of justice is to determine who, when where and for what purpose certain crafts are exercised. There is a tension between the internal and external goods of a craft. Someone who is too concerned about the external goods of his or her craft will not attain the internal goods. A doctor who is too concerned with making money might spend too little time and effort with each patient to do a good job of making them well. This is true in politics as well. For example, a ruler who seeks income and recognition will not necessarily rule for the good of all. Glaucon and Adeimantus present a revised challenge. The challenge for Socrates: show that justice is both good in itself and good in its consequences. We have to explicate extrinsic and intrinsic goodness to see if this challenge is met. Extrinsic goodness, good in its consequences. In general terms, this would mean something is good because it enables us to procure other goods. Some of the most important consequences of justice and injustice comes from other people recognizing that we are just or unjust. We may be rewarded if we our just and punished if we are not just. Intrinsic goodness, good for its own sake: justice brings us well being independently of any other consequences. In particular, justice brings us well being independently of whether people recognize our justice and reward us for it. Glaucon presents the view that most people are just as a result of the consequences of injustice. Most people would benefit from injustice, if they could get away with it. If, for example, they had the ring of Gyges which made them invisible. But most people Can not get away with injustice, all the time Would not want to live in a world in which it was easy for other people to get away with injustice. It is worse to suffer injustice than to be prevented from being unjust oneself. Thus people agree not to be unjust to each other and form agreements to enforce these agreements or laws. This is, the basic elements of the social contract view of the origin of morality and government, as found, for example in the work of John Locke. But Glaucon would like Socrates to show that one should be just for its own sake. In order to determine whether it is good to be just, justice must be defined. Socrates argues that it would be easier to define justice in a polis, before defining justice in an individual. Presumably this is, in part, because a just person would carry out certain tasks in his or her political community in a certain way. We can’t know what these are unless we know what justice in the political community is. So Socrates, with the help of Glaucon, Adeimantus and the others set out to determine what justice is in the polis and individual soul. They do this by trying to construct a polis in speech / reason (logos.). The first polis in logos: the polis of pigs Political communities are founded because we are not self-sufficient Each of us must make use of each other. We need associates and helpers to live in one place. The fundamental rule of a good polis: one person, one job. A polis is likely to be much more productive if each person does only one kind of work. Some people are better suited by nature to doing one kind of work or another People become better at doing a job with practice and experience People are better at doing work that they enjoy doing. Some work requires either a great deal of attention from people or attention at the proper time. Someone is likely to be better at such a job if they are not doing another, different kind of work. In the polis of pigs, people pursue only necessities, that is only what they need to survive and be minimally comfortable in the first polis. They do not seek luxuries. They trade with one another to provide each other with necessary goods. This polis is neither just nor unjust Given the limited desires of people, there is no conflict between them. So people will not take any goods from anyone else. There is no injustice. By the same token, there is no justice either. Justice is only necessary when there is conflict between people over scarce goods, that is, when the desires of people outstrip the supply of goods that satisfy these desires. A conception of justice tell us who rightfully deserves how much of which goods. When there is no such conflict, as there is not in the first polis, there is no need for justice. Why do Glaucon and Adeimantus reject the first polis? They have a taste for luxuries, which can be explained in Platonic terms by looking at the parts of the soul (see V below.) The second polis: basic principles A luxurious polis makes war necessary, because there are not enough goods (and, especially, land) to satisfy the desires of everyone in all cities Socrates raises the question of whether it is good to have a luxurious polis The answer implicit in The Republic is that There is no alternative given the human tendency to desire more than is necessary to stay alive have expansive appetites (see V below on the parts of the soul) Despite the cost—which is the acceptance of conflict and warfare— it is better to be in a luxurious city because only such a city allows for human beings to satisfy the ends that are most likely to lead to human well being. As we see later, this includes, most notably, philosophy. Thus there must be warriors. They are initially called guardians, although later the rulers are given this name while those who fight, but do not rule, are called auxiliaries. Auxiliaries must be spirited in order to risk their lives (spiritedness is the translation of thymos.) Guardians must be harsh to enemies but gentle with their own people. This can only be brought about by giving them the proper education. Without making much of it, Socrates reinstates Polemarchus’s conception of justice, at least in so far as inter-polis relations are concerned. The leadership and military force of the kallipolis will aim at helping friends (that is the kallipolis and, we shall see later, allied cities) and hurting the enemies of the kallipolis, including those other political communities whose land the kallipolis needs to provide its citizens with whatever luxuries they are permitted. The education of the guardians and auxiliaries. Poetry and music, is central to their education. Poetry and music must be rigorously controlled by the polis in order for the guardians to receive a good education content Stories about the gods must be censored to show the Gods only doing just and proper actions, so as to provide a good model for the guardians The gods are also to be held be responsible only for what is good form Guardians are not allowed to imitate (or act the part) of those who do unjust or immoderate actions Musical rhythms and harmonies must be regulated so that moderation is encouraged and licentiousness discouraged. Gymnastic The aim of gymnastics is to train the soul. Physical training is harsh and demanding. It gives people the discipline to control their bodily desires pride in their accomplishment, in meeting some ideal standard. This satisfies the spirited part of the soul And directs it towards restraining rather than encouraging the appetitive part of the soul Too much gymnastic without music and poetry strains the soul and makes it harsh. (See below on parts of the soul) The Soul The city is discussed before the soul because it is easier to see its parts and justice. To fully understand the nature of the city however, one must understand the character of the souls of the people in each class. Thus, in these this review of the arguments we have considered in class, I will begin with the soul and then turn to the city. Three parts of the soul Appetitive or desiring part. Consists of Bodily desires Basic necessities: food, drink (including intoxicants), clothing, shelter, sex Luxuries that make life more comfortable and pleasant. This seems to include art and music, although perhaps not all art and music. (see below ***) The desire for money to purchase goods that satisfy our bodily desires. Our capacity and / or the strength of our desire for luxuries has three sources. Indulgence strengthens our appetites. Those who The interaction of the appetitive part of the soul with the spirited part can strengthen our appetites and give us a desire for luxuries see V B 3 on the spirited part of the soul. The interaction of the appetitive part of the soul with the rational or philosophic part of the soul can also strengthen our appetites and give us a taste for luxuries Human beings often have a capacity to develop tastes for new kinds of goods, for example, new foods and music That capacity, in some people, leads to a desire for new and different kinds of goods Socrates, for example, seems to have a taste for innovation, which explains his presence at the religious festival at the beginning of book I. more complicated goods This desire lead seems to involve both the appetitive and rational parts of the soul since it requires the development of knowledge. But this involves knowledge of what Socrates calls "sights and sounds" rather than knowledge of the forms. It is precisely because the two parts of the soul are connected that they aim at knowledge of sights and sounds rather than the forms and combine both intellectual and sensual pleasure. Thymos, the spirited part of the soul. Thymos or spiritedness is a complicated desire that includes our desires for esteem (including self-esteem), honor, recognition, distinction, and prestige It is the part of the soul in which anger is found, as anger is the characteristic emotional reaction when we are treated with disrespect or disregard Satisfaction of the spirited part of the soul is possible only if We have certain standards or ideals by which we evaluate ourselves or in terms of which we seek recognition from others. We meet these standards or ideals. These standards or ideals can be for individual achievement or the collective achievement of a group of people. In the later case, one can take pride in both The achievements of the group. One’s individual contribution to the achievements of the group. These ideals or standards may vary a great deal from one person to another. Typically our ideals and standards are those we are inculcated to have by our family, friends, and political community Thus thymos can lead us to pursue a wide variety of goods. And, in particular, it can lead us both to and away from the satisfaction of our appetites Socrates emphasize the way in which spiritedness leads us to restrain our appetites. This would occur when, for example, we take pride in our discipline and self-restraint and hold up moderation as our ideal. But we can also achieve recognition and esteem by indulging in our appetites to a greater degree than others. This explains such phenomena as certain kinds of promiscuity and conspicuous consumption. The dual nature of spiritedness helps explain the peculiar reactions of Glaucon Initially he disdains the city of pigs, because he does not like the food. This reaction, it seems, results in part from Glaucon's thinking that plain and simple food is beneath him. That is, the spirited part of his soul has reinforced the appetitive part of his soul. This same sentiment can be seen in Glaucon's boastfulness about his sexual life. Later, Glaucon enthusiastically supports Socrates proposal that the guardians eat simple and plain food. Now, imagining himself a guardian, Glaucon can take pride in self-restraint and moderation Thus the relationship between Socrates and Glaucon gives us a model of the kind of education of the soul that Socrates has proposed. The spirited part of the soul can be strengthened by discipline as in gymnastic training, as this training gives people the capacity to moderate their bodily desires in order to meet their ideas. But if this part of the soul is strengthened without music or poetry, then people become harsh or rigid. Harshness comes from the lack of appreciation of the goods of art and music, which leads a person to overvalue self-restraint. Self-restraint can be bad for us, if it leads us to forgo pleasures (of the body or the soul) that are not harmful to us. Rigidity comes from the inability to call our own standards and ideals into question Note that Socrates implicitly suggests that art and music involve both the appetitive and the rational part of the soul. Their influence on the appetitive part of the soul is evident in the initial discussion in books II and III. In discussing gymnastic, however, Socrates points out that music and art are necessary to stimulate the rational or philosophic part of the soul. This supports the notion, mentioned above, that our appetites are influenced by the rational part of the soul. The rational or philosophic part Initially it seems that this part of the soul has the task of planning for the satisfaction of our other desires. In this it would be valuable. Later it becomes evident that this part of the soul has desires of its own and, in particular, the desire for knowledge. The kallipolis: the best or beautiful polis There are three classes in the polis Craftsmen and farmers or money makers who each do one job. They provide the goods needed by the other members of the kallipolis The craftsmen and farmers trade with each other for the goods they need They pay taxes to the guardians and auxiliaries so that the latter can purchase the goods they need. trade with other polises. Auxiliaries who defend the city from external attack and internal division. Their desire for appetitive goods is kept in check by their spirited desire which enables them to discipline themselves and thus limit these desires. Guardians who rule. At first it seems that the guardians should rule because they seek knowledge. The assumption here is that the knowledge they seek will enable them to rule the kallipolis wisely. Initially it seems that this knowledge is instrumental in nature. That is, it enables the guardians to guide the polis in attaining its aims. Later it becomes clearer that the most important knowledge is of what a kallipolis would look like. Knowledge of the forms will give the guardians a template by which they will create the kallipolis. Still later in the book it becomes evident that the most important reason that the guardians must rule is that they are philosophers. They are interested in the pursuit of knowledge not the goods of the craftsmen and farmers or auxiliaries. They do not have expansive appetitive desires. seek the honor and prestige of soldiers. Indeed, they do not seek to rule at all. They would prefer to spend their time pursuing knowledge. Thus they are good rulers because they do not seek to rule. They will not rule in their own interest (e.g. by accumulating appetitive goods, prestige and power) The external goods of ruling do not interfere with the internal goods of ruling. (See above for this distinction.) How the classes are created. Socrates assumes that people are different by nature. The key difference, it seems, is in the character of their souls. And here the main difference is in the strength of the three parts of their souls. Those whose rational part is strongest should become guardians. Those whose spirited part is strongest should become auxiliaries. Those whose appetitive part is strongest should become craftsmen and farmers. There is no assumption that the natural character of the soul is always inherited. Guardians might have children with the souls of craftsmen. Craftsmen might have children with the souls of guardians. So, there must be some way in which children are tested at an early age to determine which class they should belong to. Those children who have the souls of guardians and auxiliaries enter into the special training described above. Those children who have the souls of craftsmen and farmers are raised in traditional families by members of this class. Children of the guardian who do not have the souls of guardians are either Killed by exposure. Or perhaps adopted by craftsmen (although Socrates nowhere says this.) Guardians and auxiliaries receive the same education. At a later age, those who seem best suited to have a philosopher education are selected for additional education. The others become auxiliaries The lives of the guardians and auxiliaries. Property. Guardians and auxiliaries live in barracks and eat in a common mess hall. They have no privacy and no private property. Thus they have no luxuries of any kind. Their appetitive desires are provided for by taxing the craftsmen and farmers. The three waves: Women are guardians Socrates argues that women are not different from men in the characteristics relevant to being a guardian and auxiliaries. The only important characteristic is the quality of their soul. Even though men on average might be better suited to being guardians than women Women can have philosophic and spirited souls as well In general, Socrates argues that men are better than women on some many tasks on average, but many individual women are better than individual men. Given the arrangement of the kallipolis, women must be guardians. Craftsmen and farmers live in traditional families while guardians live in common and their children are raised in common. The women among craftsmen and farmers, like the men, seek to satisfy they appetitive desires and thus seek money. Male guardians could not marry and raise children with them since that would violate the prohibitions on their having private property and a family. They could not bring up the children of guardians alone, since those children are meant to be trained to have only limited appetitive desires. They would not be willing to give their children up to be raised by guardians. Among the goods craftsmen and farmers seek is to raise children. Thus women must be guardians. Only women guardians are able to contribute to the proper upbringing of children and to allow their children to be raised in common. Socrates expects to be ridiculed for this proposal. Women and children (and men) in common Until men and women pass the age of childbearing, all sexual relationships are subject to the rule of the polis. Sex is only allowed between married guardians and married auxiliaries. (I shall in the rest of this section write only of guardians. The same rules presumably apply to auxiliaries.) Marriage, however, is only a license to have sex until the woman conceives a child. Then the marriage ends. Marriages are made by the older guardians, who try to insure that the best guardian males have sex with the best guardian women. A fixed lottery is used to reconcile those who have sex less often to their fate. Soldiers who are particularly brave in battle are give permission to marry. All children are raised in common. They do not know who their particular parents are and the parents do not know who their children are. All children born at a certain time consider all the parents who had conceived these children to be their parents. In essence, Socrates calls for the abolition of the family. Socrates expects to be ridiculed for this proposal, too. Philosophers must rule: On the rationale for this see above. Socrates expects to be ridiculed for this proposal, as well. Philosophers and their are not understood by the citizens of most political communities. Those who are potential philosophers are corrupted in most political communities. Ambitious politicians use their intellectual skills to help them secure power. Why do the guardians and auxiliaries live in common? (In what follows, I write about the guardians. But most of this applies to the auxiliaries as well.) Socrates hopes to eliminate any temptation on the part of the guardians and auxiliaries to take the goods of the craftsmen Because they are not allowed any private property or privacy, the guardians and auxiliaries will find it difficult to accumulate such goods. Thus these arrangements supports and strengthens the disinclination of guardians and auxiliaries to have pursue appetitive goods divide one part of each of these classes from another Because they have no private property and no family, the guardians and auxiliaries will not favor themselves or their own family in the distribution of the goods allotted to them. And they will not be motivated to accumulate such goods in order to benefit their family members. Socrates hopes to make the guardians and auxiliaries utterly united. In that Each of the guardians and auxiliaries will be of equal importance to all the others. When one is in pain, they are all supposed to feel that pain. This is accomplished by, in so far as possible giving the guardians the same education and life experiences making each guardian feel as if he or she has family ties to all the other guardians Each one is a son or daughter of many older guardians, Each one is a brother and sister and/or a spouse of many guardians roughly the same age Each one is a father or mother to many younger guardians The craftsmen are reconciled to their lack of power and prestige. Given their own desires for appetitive goods and family life, the craftsmen will not envy the auxiliaries and guardians. The lives of the craftsmen and farmers. They live in traditional families. The guardians do not allow them to become to rich or too poor. If they are too poor: They will not have the means to produce the goods necessary to the city. They will not want to work because they will get no reward. And presumably will also be very unhappy. If they are too rich: they will not want to work hard because they would prefer to enjoy their money and the comforts it brings. There is a tension between the desire for money and the desire for appetitive goods and comforts. The craftsmen and farmers have moderate appetitive desires and thus would presumably not work hard if they were too rich. Why are they moderate? Anyone with a spirited or philosophic is excluded from the craftsmen. As we saw above, these parts of the soul might, under certain conditions, stimulate the desire for appetitive goods. Their limited riches prevents them from indulging too much in the satisfaction of their appetitive desires. The Noble Lie The members of all three classes are told That were brothers under the earth. They have been placed in the appropriate class because of the quality of their souls, which his due to the metal in it. Guardians: gold Auxiliaries: silver Craftsmen and farmers: iron and bronze What is the point of the noble lie: To encourage unity in the polis To encourage the members of each class to only do what is appropriate to members of their class. This is especially important if the process of selection is not perfect and children with inappropriate souls enter the classes. To encourage the members of each class to allow their children to be taken from them and place in another class, if this is appropriate. The virtues in the kallipolis The virtues Wisdom: The polis is wise because it is ruled by guardians who are wise. in the Courage: The polis is courageous because the auxiliaries are courageous. Moderation: The polis is moderate because the appetitive goods allowed the craftsmen and farmers is limited by the guardians and auxiliaries to and, presumably because, their desires themselves are moderate, in the way described above. Justice: Each individual is in the proper class and each class performs its proper role Each class is happy, but none are entirely happy in the kallipolis. This shows us that, even in the best polis, there are limits to human happiness. The guardians get a wonder education which enables them to pursue knowledge. But they must be compelled to rule. They do so because they are obligated to the polis that has raised them and given them an opportunity to become a guardian they know that the polis would founder and their own lives would be undermined if they do not rule. And they very well might regret the limitations on their satisfaction of their appetitive desires. (See below.) The auxiliaries are honored and praised by the polis But they might also regret the limitations on their satisfaction of their appetitive desires. They do not have the highest status in the polis: they must take orders from the guardians And they do not have the pleasures of the pursuit of knowledge to make up for the lack of satisfaction of their appetitive desires Although they do have the pleasures of self-esteem and self-control. The craftsmen are ruled well. They are protected from external and internal enemies who might take their goods and their lives. But they must accept restraints on the satisfaction of their appetitive desires. . The virtues in the soul: a just soul is one in which the philosophic part of the soul rules over the whole soul with the aid of the spirited part. The nature of the virtues Wisdom: The soul of a just individual is ruled by the philosophic part. His or her overriding aim is the pursuit of knowledge. Courage: The soul of a just individual has strong spirited desires. But these desires are shaped by the ideals set down by the philosophic part of the soul. Moderation: The soul of a individual man does not have expansive appetitive desires. He or she does not indulge in the satisfaction of appetitive desires, thus strengthening them unduly. His or her spirited desires constrain rather than incite these desires. His or her philosophic desires aims at knowledge of the forms, not sights and sounds. Justice: each part of the soul plays its proper role. The just individual and other individuals Only people dominated by the philosophic part of their soul can have a just soul. Thus justice is neither possible, nor good for its own sake for most people This distinctly qualifies Socrates’s defense of justice. Those with primarily a spirited or appetitive soul are just in a secondary sense in the kallipolis. Because they accept the rule of philosophers, in the kallipolis, they play their appointed roles Outside the kallipolis, however, people with spirited or appetitive souls are not just. Appetitive types, (craftsmen and farmers) taken out of the kallipolis will seek political power so as to increase their income and wealth. They will tax the rich and redistribute income to themselves. They will seek benefits from the polis, but not be willing to pay their share. Spirited types (auxiliaries) taken out of the kallipolis will also seek political power. Their aim, however, will be the honor and glory of military conquest and / or riches. Taken together, one perhaps gets a city like Athens, in which the devoted citizens, (the spirited) seek empire out of a desire for glory and the appetitive citizens (the craftsmen and farmers) seek empire in order to increase their income and wealth. The just person, the philosopher, outside of the kallipolis will not act exactly like the guardians in the kallipolis. Most of the restraints on the guardians are not found in the kallipolis And they will need some amount of private property to survive. Philosophers outside of the kallipolis might choose to marry and have children. Or, at the very least, freed of the restraints on their desires for food, sex and so forth, they might satisfy these desires more than guardians do. But Their desires for appetitive goods will not be the central force it is in the life of those with appetitive souls (craftsmen and farmers or, as we see below, democratic human beings). And their desires for appetitive goods will not be the driving force it is in the life of tyrants. Rather, their appetitive desires will much under the control of the philosophic part of their soul. As we see below, even appetitive desires can be desires for pure pleasures, provided that we have not strengthened our desires for impure pleasures because of indulgence in these desires and the influence of the spirited part of our soul on these desires. Just soul and justice in the conventional sense Throughout The Republic, Socrates presupposes that we all have a rough idea of what justice is. Even if we cannot give an abstract or theoretical account of justice, we can still recognize just and unjust acts in many particular cases, especially where the circumstances are clear and unambiguous Thus, the definitions of justice provided by Cephalus is shown to be mistaken by means of an example. And, Socrates supposes that we recognize the wisdom, courage, moderation and justice are virtues, even if we cannot precisely define them. So, if Socrates’s theory of justice is to be accepted, we have to believe that people who are just as Socrates defines justice, will be just in a more or less convention way. This seems to be the case. For Socrates, justice consists in acting done from a certain character, not from following rules. But it seems that a just person would follow conventional rules in most cases, but not in those cases where the rules lead to bad results (as in the case discussed by Socrates and Cephalus.) For example A just person, a philosopher, would not steal from others because he would not have strong appetitive desires Philosophy and the Forms Forms: a brief overview. (Note that this overview is meant to give you a general picture of Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology. I have not entirely kept to Plato's own examples or conceptual notions in explaining the forms.) Why does Socrates turn to epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and metaphysics (the theory of what there is or what kinds of things there are.) He has two main aims, I believe. First, Socrates wants to help us understand why we disagree about matters and how we can determine what we should rationally believe. There are a variety of opinions about the world around us. In The Republic, the key issues are: what justice and the other virtues are whether we should be just. Socrates wants to show us how to find out the truth about the range of matters discussed in The Republic. Socrates wants to know if there any truth of the matter. So he must investigate how we come to have knowledge. Thus Socrates will be trying to explain how he can give his account of the kallipolis and just soul. Second, Socrates wants us to understand the aims of the philosopher. To understand the kallipolis and justice fully, we must know what the aims and goals of a philosopher are If we are to understand the world around us, it might make sense to begin with our experiential knowledge To focus, that is on concrete things, things visible to our senses This is the modern approach to knowledge: all knowledge built up from sense knowledge But Socrates holds that knowledge must be result of more than our sense experience. We have opinions, and presumably knowledge, that seems to come from abstract thought as well as concrete experience Concrete experience alone could not lead us to the opinions we have This seems to be true about political matters Two people differ about whether to call some action just That one is right and other wrong cannot just be the result of concrete experience Even if concrete experience plays an important role in determining which is right. There must be knowledge that transcends any particular experience. If knowledge about these matters is possible, there must be knowledge that arise from generalization about our experience. And generalization requires abstraction: separating out general and particular aspects of experience, what is found everywhere and what is found in a particular case This point is difficult to see in politics, but it can be more clearly seen in simpler cases Along with concrete things visible to our senses, we have knowledge of abstract things. These are the forms. They have been variously interpreted in one or more of the following ways: Abstract ideas of quantity and quality Ideas of relationship. Such as big vs. small; Whether something is big or small depends upon what we are comparing it to. some understanding of the notions of big and small: We need to grasp the sense or respect in which we are comparing two things. Thus our judgment that something is big or small rests on more than our sense experience of two perceptual things Ideas of quantity: numbers and other mathematical objects. We cannot grasp the notion of a number system simply by looking at a lot of perceptual objects. Abstract things that are understood in functional terms. For example, there are no material feature that are shared by all televisions or beds. Rather, something is a television or bed if it can be used to carry out a certain function or purpose. Things understood in functional terms include both artifacts made by human beings biological phenomena For example, what makes something a heart is that it carries out a certain function Human capacities and powers Each of the parts of the soul might be understood as having certain purpose or aims Although modern natural science no longer understands physical phenomena in functional terms, the dominant kinds of pre-modern science understood even what we think of as physical phenomena in this way The sun star, for example, could be defined in functional terms as Providing light Providing the gravitational attraction that holds the solar system together The definition of functional terms make some reference to certain standards of evaluation. For example, given that the purpose of a knife is to cut, a good knife is one that serves this purpose well. Causal forces or powers that account for our experience but can not themselves be experienced via our senses These forces can be Physical forces such as the four forces of contemporary physics: e.g. gravity and electromagnetism. Things that can be understood to exert some characteristic effect on or attraction for human beings, such as Beauty Order Our understanding of these forces requires us to isolate certain kinds of causes and effects from others. Our perceptual experience is the result of a variety of forces working at once in which these forces have different strengths depending upon the particular objects we are studying For example, the strength and direction of gravitational attraction at any one spatio-temporal location depends upon the mass and location of physical objects It takes a great effort of abstraction to understand the impact of one of these force apart from all others. Forms are, depending upon interpretation, all or some of these abstract things. Knowledge of them requires intellectual knowledge abstract reasoning theorizing that goes beyond mere perceptual knowledge concrete experience empirical observation. Knowledge of the forms is the central aim of philosophers. Such knowledge is superior to knowledge based "sights and sounds" because: Knowledge of the forms is general knowledge, applicable everywhere. Knowledge of many perceptual things that are exemplars of a form will not give us general knowledge For example, if we know the form of a dog, we will be able to understand a wide variety of behavior of many perceptual dogs But experience with even a large number of dogs may not help us to deal with a particular dog that is quite different from the ones we have known. Nor will knowledge of particular dogs help us understand other animals But knowledge of the form of a dog would, presumably, be interconnected with our knowledge of the form of other animals. Our knowledge of, say, of the forms of dinosaurs rests on some limited observation of perceptual things and our general knowledge the forms of other, related, animals General knowledge is thus useful under a variety of circumstances. Although Plato did not hold, as modern philosophers, that theoretical knowledge is always directly practical in that it gives us power to control the world around us. The Republic suggests that knowledge of the forms would give philosophers the practical capacity to create a kallipolis But, as we shall see below, it is doubtful how far this knowledge exists and can be applied by philosopher-kings. Still general knowledge enables us to understand the world in all circumstances General knowledge is more challenging, demanding and thus more pleasant to acquire for those who most enjoy pursuing knowledge.. Knowledge of the forms is knowledge of something that does not change Given our own mortality, we long for some connection to what is more or less eternal That explains, in part, our desires for Children Having some long term effect on the world around us Lasting fame This desire can also, and perhaps best, be satisfied through intellectual knowledge of eternal things Perceptual knowledge is of things that change and, most usually, decay and change Perceptual knowledge cannot be passed down to our children or followers We can pass on our full knowledge of the form of a cat But we cannot pass on very much of our knowledge of a particular cat of ours who is now dead. Knowledge of the forms is knowledge of things that are perfect. This in not true of our knowledge of perceptual things. Thus knowledge of the forms should be less frustrating and limited. The world of the forms is less chaotic than that which we perceive with our senses. Exemplars of certain forms, such as functional forms, are always imperfect. No TV or bed is quite ideal. Particular perceptual things have many features and we cannot give a complete account of them. Perceptual things realize conflicting forms. Form examples, everything is both big and small, depending upon the point of comparison. Perceptual things are affected by a variety of powers or forces so that our understanding of them is likely to be incomplete, even if our understanding of the forms were complete. For example the development of a particular human embryo is affected by many factors. Some are internal to the embryo and can be theoretically explained, although some variations may be due to factors that, from the point of view of our theory, are contingent Others are external to the embryo, such as what a mother eats. Because these factors are not accounted for by the science of embryology, then that science cannot fully explain the development of particular embryos. Even if the course of events is shaped by one force or power, it may still be impossible to fully predict our sensory experience, because that force or power comes into play in many ways. For example, the prediction of the path of the planets around the sun is always imperfect because the mass of every other celestial body effects the gravitational forces that determine this path. Knowledge of the forms is beautiful The forms of things are not just perfect but related to one another in an ordered fashion. Each form seeks to explain certain phenomena with simple principles. Knowledge of a range of forms gives us an interconnected account of a range of phenomena that is both complex and ordered. At the same time, we experience understanding of the forms as surprising and revelatory. This knowledge appeals to our sense of wonder. Knowledge of the forms gives us an understanding of the place of each kind of thing in the good life for human beings. See the good. The Sun and the Good There many good things but one form of the good, which is thus intellected rather than seen. Sight, hearing analogy Three elements We see things with eyes, hear with ears There are things seen and heard Sight and hearing also needs a third class of things 507d light: The sense of sight and the power of being seen are yoked together with a yoke, that by the measure of an idea by no means insignificant is more honorable than the yokes uniting other teams, if light is not without honor 508a The sun is god responsible for this, whose light makes our sight see in the finest way and the seen things seen Neither sight nor that in which it comes to be, the eyes, is the sun Eye gets power it has from an overflow from the sun's treasury In other words, sight would be impossible without (i) eyes, (ii) the things seen, and (iii) light from the sun. Socrates suggests the following analogies good: intelligible region: intelligence sun: things seen: sight The good is the king of the intelligible class and region, while the other is the king of the visible What is the good and how is it analogous to the sun? The good is fundamental to our understanding of the forms It gives us capacity to know the forms. Just as the light of the sun enables our eyes to see It makes the forms knowable The sun lights up objects Glaucon : good must be pleasure; Socrates: don't blaspheme The good makes the forms what they are. The sun provides things seen with generation, growth, nourishment though it isn't itself generation The good is not responsible for our capacity to know the forms but also for the nature of the forms "Not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result, although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power The good and its role in knowledge of the forms has been interpreted in at least four different ways (which are not necessarily incompatible with one another.) Everything comes out of the good On this interpretation, the good is seen as a kind of god responsible for the creation of the forms. The forms are a kind of emanation from, overflowing of the good On some understandings, the good necessarily creates the other forms precisely because of its very nature as the good This interpretation is found in neo-Platonist thought which is then carried over into some Jewish and Christian theologies, where God replaces the good. On this view, the forms are ideas in the mind of God which God used as a template to create the physical world Knowing is intrinsically good On this view, our desire to know makes knowing possible. The desire to know is the third thing, along with our capacity to know and the things know, that is, the forms To know form of X is impossible without knowing what a good x would be Forms are paradigms, ideals, pure exemplars of certain things This is most easily seen with regard to functional terms. We can’t understand what a functional thing, X, is unless we understand what its purpose. To know the purpose of X is, is to know what a good X would be. For example, we can’t know what a TV or bed or knife or heart is unless we have some sense of what a good TV, bed or knife is. And much the same thing could be said about the parts of functional things To know what a TV tuner is, is to know what a good one would be To know what a heart valve is, is to know what a good one would be. Forms as forces and r powers: to know them is to know their characteristic effect. This might include how they contribute to the good of human beings. This notion is clearer with regards to those forces that specifically effect human beings such as beauty But we also might understand physical forces, such as gravity, as playing a role in constituting a physical universe that contributes to the human good Forms of quantity and quality. Here, too, we might understand the forms of quantity and quality as playing an indirect role in contributing to the human good Knowing the good of individual forms might be connected with understanding the forms as standing in an ordered and, perhaps, hierarchical relationship to one another So the good of an individual form is understood in terms of its contribution with another forms to the good of human beings We might, for example, understand how the forms of carbohydrates and proteins contribute to keeping our bodies health and alive in terms of its contribution to the good of another form For example, a good heart is one that plays the appropriate role in keeping bodies healthy and alive. Or a good cow would be one that provided some of the various foods (and thus nutrients) that human beings need A good cow is one that provides us with milk and meat On this view of the good, our understanding of the whole or the universe is shaped by the human perspective To understand the whole or the universe is to see it as good as a whole and in its parts But that is to understanding from the perspective of our own interests and concerns, that is our wants and desires Not necessarily any of our wants and desires But those that would be expressed in the best or happiest life for human beings   Thus, on this interpretation of Plato, there is no pure, objective understanding of world in the sense of one that is entirely apart from human concerns and interests. The Cave The story of the cave Socrates asks us to imagine an underground cave There is a long entrance open to the light. Human beings are deep in the cave with their with legs and necks in bonds They are facing the back of the cave and can only see what is in front of us They can’t see behind or from side to side. There is light from fire above and beyond us. Between the fire and prisoners is a road, along which a wall built like the partitions puppet handlers set in front of the human beings Along wall are human beings carrying all sorts of artifacts, of men and animals and other things from all sorts of material. Some carriers utter sounds while others are silent. They are like us, according to Plato. They see only shadows and hear echoes They talk about what they see and hear as if they were real things. A human being can only be released from the cave if someone comes and breaks his chains, compels him to stand up, turn around and look at the light This is painful, because the light hurts his eyes. And, at first, he or she couldn’t see But then he would see that the cause of shadows and echoes he heard were the artifacts being carried along the wall and the sounds made by those who carried them To get out of the cave, a persona must be dragged by force across rough steep upward way into the light of sun. Again, this trip is distressing and annoying And such a person wouldn't be able to see when he got out of the cave. He or she would have to get accustomed to seeing things in the light First would see shadows, then phantoms of human beings and other things in water Then would see the light of stars and moon at night And then would see the sun and all the things outside the cave Eventually, a person freed from the cave would recognize that what he sees the real things that are the model for the artifacts carried along the wall in the cave, that casts the shadows they saw when they were in chains. Those outside the cave would consider themselves happy and pity those still stuck in chains. They would have knowledge knowledge of what their own previous circumstances were knowledge of the real things that they saw only in artifacts and images before Once released from the cave, no one would want to return. If went someone went back into cave They would not be able to see because of the darkness They would be laughed at by the people in the cave Because it would be hard, at first, for them to see Because no one would believe what those who had been out of the cave said about what they had seen Interpretation of the cave The cave is the visible world, the world of perceptual things. Outside the cave is the intelligible world, the world of forms The cave is also the polis That those bound up in that cave look at images, suggests that What we think we know of the world, our conventional opinion, is shaped not by what we directly experience, but by what we have been told Those who do the telling are primarily poets, who make the artifacts that cast the shadows we see The political opinions of the polis are not true, but are images that do not clearly reflect the truth Any polis is held together by a conception of justice, of who deserves and should get what goods Since there are not enough goods to go around, there must be some conception of justice widely accepted in the polis For, if not, the different groups in the polis would be in constant struggle In many, and perhaps most, political communities, there is only partial agreement that provides the background for struggle This is true of the kallipolis as well. The citizens of the kallipolis believe certain falsehoods. Only the guardians who are older know the truth about the polis. The noble lie about gold, silver, bronze and iron in the souls of people. The sexual lottery Our conventional opinions are not wholly wrong. They are images of perceptual objects which, themselves are imperfect instantiations of forms But our opinions are confused, contradictory, and incoherent That there might be some truth to our opinions, however, is what enables us to proceed to knowledge of perceptual things and the forms We try to make our opinions more coherent in the process of gaining knowledge of perceptual things and the forms It is a struggle to leave the cave. People are reluctant to give up their conventional opinions For their lives and hopes are based upon them. Recall Cephalus People cannot leave by themselves Their changes have to be broken and they have to be dragged up. This takes place in two steps. First we question the images by comparing them to the perceptual objects Then we understand the perceptual objects by grasping the forms they instantiate. Education, then, is not primarily a matter of giving people knowledge but of turning their souls around. Showing them what they should be looking for: knowledge of the forms Enabling them to transcend the opinions of the polis. Philosophers and the polis Philosophers are the educators, who challenge conventional ideas and, in doing so, compel people to recognize the possibility that their opinions are confused And give them a glimpse of what knowledge of the forms would be To leave cave, practice philosophy, is to lose concern with things of the city But philosophers are compelled to go back into cave. To rule in the kallipolis To find students in all other cities. Philosophers seek students In order to pass along their knowledge In order to engage in the discussion and debate that is central to the pursuit of knowledge Democracy In book 8, Socrates examines the decline of the kallipolis in a series of steps that take us, he says, from the best regime to the worst, tyranny. The series of regimes A timocracy is ruled by spirited types who seek honor. An oligarchy is ruled by appetitive types who are more concerned with accumulating money than buying goods and indulging their appetites. A democracy is ruled by appetitive types who are more concerned with buying goods and indulging their appetites than with accumulating money. A tyranny is ruled by a person who seeks political power in order to have the means to satisfy each and every appetite to its fullest. Each type of regime is dominated by a person with a certain kind of soul The democratic soul A person with a democratic soul is often the son or daughter of an oligarch He or she has no need to accumulate money And has been indulged, because his or her parents have money Such a person has always been able to satisfy whatever desires he or she has This, we saw above, leads to a weakening of the spirited part of the soul great desire for the appetitive pleasures The soul of a democratic person is purely appetitive in nature. He or she Seeks to satisfy his bodily desires of all types: food, sex, drink, shelter Not just those desires that are necessary to life But also for comforts and luxuries Including poetry and music that, we saw above, are in part, sensual pleasures Is changeable and flits from the satisfaction of one desire to another. A democratic person is attracted to all kinds of appetitive goods. They all provide pleasures of different kinds And the democratic person does not want to miss anything A democratic person is undisciplined His or her spirited part of the soul is weak. He or she finds it very unpleasant to resist any desires. Accept any difficulties or unpleasantness And does not have any vision of an ideal or distinctive or higher life that would lead him or her to sacrifice some pleasure or accept some discomfort So, a the democratic person will pursues a new activity only to a certain point. For pleasure in most activities, after a time, makes some demands upon us Many activities can be understood in a way that makes them charming and pleasant at first. The surface charm and pleasure can, however, become boring after a time. To keep them from becoming boring, one must advance in the activity, developing one’s skills and abilities along the way. But the advanced learning this can sometimes be difficult and challenging. It requires discipline to overcome these difficulties and meet the challenges. Democratic people, however, lack this discipline. Examples of such activities include: Studying a subject Learning about one of the arts or becoming an artist The political aims of democratic people: Their most important aim is for freedom They want freedom to engage in any activity to satisfy their desires. They want to be free from both Legal compulsion from the government, which threatens them with punishment Political and social condemnation from their friends and neighbors, which threatens them with derision For democrats, all desires are equal. Thus democrats seek to undermine the political and social norms and expectations that lead people to satisfy certain kinds of desire and stay away from the satisfaction of other kinds of desires. Democrats are, and encourage people to be shameless because they think that no one should be ashamed of satisfying any of their desires. Democrats call shamelessness courage, because it helps to undermine political and social norms and expectations Thus Jerry Springer, Oprah Winfrey, and Geraldo Rivera are, for people with a democratic soul, the shock troops of freedom today Their secondary aim is money. A democratic citizenry likes to receive benefits from the polis, but does not like to pay taxes. Does democracy serve everyone? How it hinders the aims of The rich Democratic cities often try to levy high taxes on the rich so as to redistribute money to the poor. The spirited Spirited citizens want the polis to attain great things. This requires citizens to sacrifice the satisfaction of their own desires in order to serve the common good Democrats do not want to do this, however. So democratic citizens are reluctant to follow the ideals proposed by more spirited people The philosophers Seek to encourage young men and women to recognize that: There are truths beyond common opinion And a better or worse way to live. But democratic citizens deny both of these claims How democracy helps The Rich It gives them freedom to make money It gives the poor the resources to buy what the rich make The spirited It gives them an opportunity to attain their own ideals and to win a following. Although this is difficult, it is not impossible The Philosophers It provides freedom Can a purely democratic political community survive? Is it possible for a political community to be indifferent to the ideals, or lack of ideals, of its citizens? A democratic citizenry can undermine a political community Because democratic citizens are motivated by appetitive pleasures and are undisciplined, they will not be willing to do some of the difficult and sometimes painful things that are necessary if a political community is to survive and prosper. For example, they might be reluctant to Fight in wars Take care of their children, which requires a great deal of effort and sacrifice on the part of parents Develop new forms of business and economic activity, which can be difficult and risky Democratic citizens undermine the income and wealth of political communities They seek much from the political community in benefits but are reluctant to pay taxes This can lead to a political community becoming financial overextended They might tax the rich so heavily that the rich are unwilling to invest their funds in new productive activities. A democratic citizenry undermines the culture of a political community They reject forms of art and entertainment that are the least bit difficult or challenging The philosopher vs the tyrant Tyrants: Are driven by powerful desires for the satisfaction of their luxurious appetites to spend a great deal of money. Then they seek power to continue down the same path. The appetitive part dominates their souls. But, unlike democratic citizens, tyrants are highly spirited. Their desire for distinction leads them to seek more appetitive goods of all kinds than anyone else has. And tyrants also have developed the philosophic part of their soul, at least up to a point. For tyrants are like philosophers in that they recognize that the polis is a cave. Only tyrants and philosophers question the conception of justice found in a polis. Tyrants, like, philosophers, see that justice varies from one polis to another. And they notice that justice is not necessarily in the interest of everyone. With Thrasymachus, they see that justice in a polis is often a matter of helping friends and harming enemies. So they ask why they should be just when doing so would not help themselves. Tyrants are never happy They are never satisfied. As soon as one desire is satisfied, another comes to replace it . They live in fear of those who they offended or hurt. They lacks friends because: Tyrants are always willing to betray their friends to satisfy their desires their "friends" tend to be people who want to use the power of tyrants for their own purposes. Tyrants lack independence from fortune and luck Fortune and luck very much influences whether a tyrant stays in power or has the money to satisfy his desires. They lack friends who can help them in bad times. philosophers Seek knowledge of the forms Are most often happy While their desire is not always satisfied, philosophers seek pure rather than impure pleasures. Three states Pleasure Calm Pain Impure pleasures result when we move from pain to calm. This is a "kind of pleasure." But this kind of pleasure is always preceded by pain, for to have a desire for an impure pleasure is painful.. Pure pleasures result when we move from calm to pleasure. To have a desire for a pure pleasure is not painful. It is a kind of pain, however, to move down from pleasure to calm. This kind of pain arises when we are doing something that gives us pure pleasure and then we are interrupted. There are pure and impure bodily pleasures. Eating when we are very hungry gives us an impure pleasure, one preceded by the pain of hunger. In such cases, we eat quickly and anything will satisfy us. When we seek pure pleasure in eating, we eat more slowly and seek particularly good food. We generally do have to be a little hungry to eat, but good food will stimulate our appetite, unless we have recently eaten a great deal. But because our appetite is stimulated at the very same time it is satisfied, we don’t suffer from the pains of hunger. The goods philosophers seek give them pure pleasures: Knowledge Bodily desires: Because philosophers are not driven by their appetites and because they would prefer to be pursuing knowledge than doing anything else, they would typically be moderate. But when need for recreation they can also pursue the satisfaction of bodily desires and do so without becoming driven or mad. Thus they are likely to seek pure rather than impure bodily pleasures.. Philosophers have friends, because the goods philosophers can be shared by all. What one philosopher learns or discovers can satisfy the desires of other philosophers for knowledge as well as stimulate her to learn more. Philosophers are more or less independent of fortune. The goods philosophers seek are relatively independent of fortune. It does not take a great deal of money or power to pursue knowledge (although it might be necessary to pursue a particular kind of knowledge, for example, that found in studying high energy physics. The smart philosopher would try to have another field of study that is not so dependent upon fortune.) Philosophers have many friends who support them in bad times. Thus Socrates hopes to satisfy the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus, by showing that the just person will generally be happier than the most unjust person, the tyrant, regardless of the consequences of their actions or the circumstances in which they live. This argument seems, in large part, plausible since for any given level of good or bad luck, the philosopher would seem to be better off than the tyrant Even tyrants with better luck would seem to be worse off than philosophers with worse luck. But it is not clear that Socrates totally supports his case. For we could imagine that a supremely lucky tyrant might be better off than a supremely unlucky philosopher who, for example, is unjustly condemned to death at an early age. That is to say, it is better to be just than unjust for it in almost all, but not all circumstances. Given that fortune is not open to our control (on this point, compare Machiavelli), it would seem that the odds favor the life of the philosopher over that of the tyrant. Is the kallipolis possible? The difficulties of creating the kallipolis Philosophers will not be able to gain political power. They don’t want to rule, so they are unlikely to seek political power Given how most citizens see them, no one is likely to follow them. Kings are not likely to become philosopher-kings. The vast majority of kings will not have the character of philosophers. Even if such a person became a king or queen, he or she is not likely to seek to continue to rule. Creating a kallipolis would take the rest of his or her life. But he or she would undoubtedly prefer to seek knowledge Philosophers will not have the power to start with a clean slate. If they did have this power, they would have to commit a monstrous crime to work on a clean slate by killing everyone over 10 And if they did this, the polis would undoubtedly be conquered by one of its neighbors. The difficulties of sustaining the kallipolis Guardians and auxiliaries may not be willing to accept the restraints on their sexual desires and romantic lives and the elimination of the family. Whether this is true or not depends upon the extent to which certain desires are at least partly natural to human beings or entirely the product of acculturation or socialization. The guardians might find their sexual lives too constrained and limited if human sexual desires are stronger and more insistent than Socrates allows for Socrates might argue that the guardians would not have particular insistent sexual desires in that Their desire for pure pleasure is satisfied in the pursuit of knowledge Thus the guardians would seek to satisfy sexual desires only when they are impure desires, that is, when they are in pain from lack of sexual fulfillment. It might be, however, that human beings have such desires much less often than we might expect from looking at sexuality in our political community. Some sexual activity here might be the result of the pursuit of the pure pleasure of sex which in turn, is stimulated by so much of our culture. The guardians would not be stimulated by provocative clothing, music, advertisements, pornography and the like Thus impure sexual desires would recur much less frequently than is the case in our political community. Some sexual activity in our political community is also the result of the combination of spirited and appetitive desires. This would also not be a problem in the kallipolis Some sexual activity in our political community is the result of romantic love, which stimulates sexual desires. This, too, would presumably not be found in the kallipolis On the other hand, it is hard to believe that sexual desire will not be stimulated by men and women exercising together in the nude. The guardians might find their sexual lives too constrained and limited if human sexual desires are more particular than Socrates imagines. Some guardians might want to have sex with particular other guardians they are especially physically attracted to or seek to have a more intimate relationship with (see below on whether such relationships will develop.) On the other hand, perhaps the sexual lottery suits the philosophers who might seek to have sex with many other guardians in order to satisfy their curiosity. The guardians might fall in love with one another. The human urge to pair up might be a fundamental feature of our nature and / or situation. Given the difficulties of human life, human beings seek relationships of mutual support with other human beings. These need not be romantic relationships—they are found in arranged marriages—but the desire for mutual support may be part of what leads to romance. The guardians will, of course, have the support of all the other guardians. And, if Socrates’s has his way, each guardian will care for each other guardian precisely as much as he or she cares for himself. But this is not what human beings seek. We seek relationships with particular other individuals precisely because we seek someone else who will put our own interests above those of anyone else. But, if we are a guardian, each guardians will care for us, but no more or less than he or she cares for all the other guardians. Thus, if the interests of the guardians or the polis as a whole come into conflict with our interest—in, for example, wartime—we will be willingly sacrificed we are Thus we would prefer to have the exclusive concern of one other person than the partial concern of all the guardians. The existence of polygamous marriage does not undermine this claim. Polygamous marriage is not found in most political communities and, even where it is found, is found primarily among the upper classes Polygamous marriages in most cases are not group marriages but involve a man in a number of pair bonds with individual women. Group marriages are difficult and conflicts arise between the various partners precisely because each partner seeks the exclusive concern of one or more of the others. Marriage in the kallipolis is essential this kind of group marriage, multiplied many times over. Upper class men in highly unequal societies can provide the mutual care desired by more than one woman in a monogamous marriage. Human beings also seek romantic relationships because we seek recognition or confirmation of our worth or goodness. It is doubtful that a relationship with a thousand other guardians who know us slightly is an adequate substitute for a relationship with one other human being, who knows us intimately. Socrates might argue that the guardians would be very much like each other, given that they have all had the same education and played the same role in the polis. But there are always differences between people due to their age, natural character. And the experiences of the guardians—in education, in war, in ruling will not all be alike. This allows for individuality to arise. Human beings seem to be capable of finding, and making much of small differences between people, in order to find a basis for romantic relationships Human beings tend to be particularly concerned with having their own children and with the well being of those children. If so, then the guardians will either favor their own children, undermining the unity of the guardians There no way to prevent guardians from having some knowledge of the relationship between particular parents and children precisely because parents and children look alike. or seek to undermine the community of women and children entirely. Socrates might argue that this is because we seek some substitute for the immortality we would prefer to have. (This point is made in another Platonic dialogue The Symposium.) If so, then the guardians might not be so concerned with having their own children since the they will leave behind them the knowledge they have gained as well as the polis itself. Given the large number of famous philosophers who were unmarried and / or childless (or who, as in the case of Rousseau, gave up their children), this argument may not be wholly implausible. Socrates, however, was married and did have children. (It is not clear that he was much of a husband or father, though. He certainly wasn’t a good provider!) On the other hand, just as human beings seek relationships with particular other people, rather than with generic others, they love their children because of their particular nature, a nature that is in some ways close to their own, whether as a result of genetic or cultural connections. The guardians may want to leave behind children who in some ways resemble their own particular nature. Human beings are likely to be particularly concerned with the satisfaction of their own desires. Is it possible for the guardians to be so united that when one is cut, they all feel the pain? Is it possible for a guardian to be entirely indifferent to whether he or another guardian survives in wartime? It is no doubt true that some human this can be this concerned about the common rather than the individual good. But, isn’t this more likely to be the case for spirited types, than for philosophers? And, isn’t it hard to believe that everyone will have this outlook all the time? An overview of these difficulties: Socrates seems to forget that we have bodies in addition to souls. If we could imagine that human beings were, like animals, bodies without souls, the kallipolis might make sense. If we had no souls or minds, we would not necessarily be concerned about our own particular well being. Nor would we reach for some kind of immortality. Animals, lacking self-consciousness and self-awareness can be bred to carry out certain tasks for the benefits of the group, whatever the costs to themselves. Be entirely concerned about the group rather than the individual If we could imagine human beings were purely souls without bodies, if our capacity to think floated free of our bodies, the kallipolis might also make sense Our sole concern would be to think and we would not be distracted from that concern by the needs of the body. Then, if we were all educated to think alike, our point of view would be precisely the same. It might even be possible for us to feel the pleasures and pains of each other. Or, even better, we might prefer to have different points of view, to spur our thinking on. For these differences would not lead us to differ with regard to the political arrangements of our polis. For there would be no polis and no justice or injustice. Justice and injustice are needed, we saw earlier, because there is conflict over goods. But this conflict only arises over the goods that satisfy our bodily desires. There is no conflict over the goods of the soul. We can give someone else our ideas without losing anything. Indeed, we can learn by teaching. goods of the there is c But because we embodied souls, there is a tension between the goods of the body and the goods of the soul. Our souls can reach beyond the limits of our bodies. We can think about things we have never experienced and that transcend our experiences We can imagine states of affairs that we cannot create We can create kinds of arrangements between human beings that are impossible for animals We can create politics and law, which Enable us to give self-conscious direction to our common efforts To reach agreements on how to divide the goods available to us But because our souls are embodied: We need nourishment, seek the satisfaction of sexual desires will die Our feelings of pain and pleasure, our wellbeing and survival are uniquely our own Our experiences are unique and different from one another. If we were immortal, we could eventually have shared many experiences with most other people. And, as a result: We seek intimate relationships of mutual support with particular other people. Sexual and romantic relationships Children When our satisfaction comes into conflict with that of others, we are inclined to favor ourselves and our own—our family, friends, political community. The difficulties in the notion of philosopher-kings. Philosopher-kings are asked to do two jobs rather than one. This seems to violate the fundamental rule of the kallipolis. Or is ruling essential to becoming a philosopher? Some information might be available to those who rule? Still, there seems to be a trade-off between gaining this information—much of which might be available in other ways—and seeking the theoretical knowledge which philosophers aim at. The knowledge philosopher-kings need does not exist. Socrates’s admits that the his account of the forms and the good is highly tentative. He denies having knowledge of the forms. Can anyone have complete, certain, and unquestionable knowledge of the forms? Or is all knowledge tentative and questionable. If complete, certain, and unquestionable knowledge of the forms existed, wouldn’t that undermine the philosophers quest for knowledge? If complete, certain, and unquestionable knowledge of the forms does not exist than the kallipolis becomes more difficult to create. For the guardians might well disagree about fundamental matters. Indeed, they might encourage disagreement and debate in the pursuit of further knowledge. Such disagreement might divide the guardians and thus the polis. Indeed, giving philosophers power might corrupt the pursuit of knowledge. Guardians would be concerned with trying out their ideas for the polis rather than those of their opponents So they would become rhetoricians not philosophers, and make arguments that convince the other guardians to see things their own way. Does it matter if the kallipolis is possible? . Questions of interpretation. For over 2000 years, The Republic has been subject to a number of competing interpretations. Here I would like to review one central point of division which revolves around the question of whether the best or ideal polis is possible. Standard Interpretation Socrates is serious about both the just polis and the just soul. The best polis is difficult, indeed, almost impossible to attain. But it can still be a model for other political communities, which try to attain the ideal as best they can. The just soul can be found in all political communities and should serve as a model for all of us. Minority Interpretation The Ideal polis is impossible to realize. So The Republic is not meant to be a work of political philosophy of the kind we have come to expect. It is not a political program. Why then, does Plato have Socrates make case for the best polis? On this interpretation, Plato has two audiences, which he expects will take something different from his book. Plato expected most people of his (and later times) to accept the standard interpretation. He hoped that: Most people (and especially rulers) would have a higher regard and respect for philosophy and philosophers. By portraying philosophers as the best rulers, he evaluates them in the terms that are most widely accepted by non-philosophers (at least in the Ancient world.) Rulers would become somewhat more idealistic, somewhat more willing to rule for the good of all rather in their own self-interest. Perhaps also somewhat more willing to listen to the advice of philosophers. Plato expected that potential philosophers would recognize the impossibility of the best polis. This would help potential philosophers by encouraging them to become philosophers rather than enter political life. This seems to be what happens to Glaucon in the course of The Republic. And it would help the polis in two ways. It would divert potential philosophers from the temptation of becoming tyrants We saw above that, in some ways, philosophers and tyrants are close to one another. It would temper the idealism that might lead a potential philosopher to enter politics. Idealism, the hope to create an ideal polity, is very problematic in politics It makes life worse for everyone when it leads rulers to try to force people to act in ways that are contrary to human nature. It makes life worse by setting up unrealistic expectations for a political community, which, in turn leads to disaffection from political life. What is the best practical regime? This is not entirely clear in this work. Socrates does point out certain advantages of democracy, at least for philosophers, who benefit from the freedom and variety found in democracies. The United States is, in Platonic terms, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy.